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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the impact of the labor regulation on firm’s employ-
ment. South Korea’s labor reform in 2007 restricted the duration of the specific types
of temporary contract—fixed term and dispatched contract—to maximum two years
and required those temporary contracts to be converted into permanent contracts af-
ter the maximum duration. We exploit the fact that the impact of the reform is larger
for the establishments that used those temporary workers intensively and apply a
difference-in-difference framework. Our empirical analysis shows that stronger em-
ployment protection reduces the establishment’s labor use. Moreover, we find that
businesses try to mitigate the impact of the employment protection by reducing the
use of fixed-term and dispatched contracts and increasing the use of atypical tempo-
rary contract that are not restricted by the reform. We also find that this shift towards
legally less burdensome contract workers becomes more prevalent when the labor
union exists.
JEL classification: J21; J23
Keywords: Employment Protection; Temporary Workers; Difference-in-Differences;
Establishment-Level; Labor Union
∗Park : Corresponding Author; Associate Fellow, Korea Development Institute; 263 Namsejong-ro,
Sejong-si 339-007, Korea; Contact at woorpark@kdi.re.kr
Baek : Assistant professor, KDI School of Public Policy and Management; 263 Namsejong-ro, Sejong-si
339-007, Korea; Contact at jbaek@kdischool.ac.kr
1
1 Introduction
The incidence of temporary employment has increased during the past few decades in
the U.S. and the majority of other OECD countries (Autor, 2003; Curci, Rani, and Sek-
erler Richiardi, 2012; OECD, 2014). Since temporary workers generally have lower job
security and poorer working conditions than regular workers, the increase in temporary
employment is considered problematic as it may lead to an increase in labor market segre-
gation among workers. Stronger employment protection for temporary workers is often
recommended to discourage the increase in the numbers of temporary employment con-
tracts (OECD, 2014). In contrast, strict employment protection is frequently blamed for
a high unemployment rates, especially in European countries (Bertola, 1990; Cahuc and
Postel-Vinay, 2002). Due to this concern, many European countries relieved the restric-
tions regarding the use of temporary contracts during the late 1990s and the early 2000s
(Kahn, 2010).
However, the theory does not provide a clear cut answer on the effect of employment
protection legislation on overall levels of employment. The literature generally predicts
that increasing employment protection would decrease job flow and job turnovers (Autor,
Kerr, and Kugler, 2007; Bertola, 1990; Lazear, 1990; Kugler and Pica, 2008; Kugler and
Paul, 2004). In particular, the effect of strengthening employment protection on overall
employment level will depend on the relative size of the decrease in hiring and layoff
which is theoretically unclear.1 Similarly, the impact of the employment protection for
temporary workers—by placing restrictions regarding the use of temporary employment
contracts—on the employment is theoretically ambiguous (Kahn, 2010).2
1Bertola (1992) shows that the presence of a positive firing cost—the employment protection for
workers—has an ambiguous effect on a firm’s average employment level whereas Fella (2000) argues that
the firing cost will unambiguously increase the aggregate employment level. However, some studies such
as Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) show that a stringent employment protection— such as imposing a tax
on job destruction—will have a negative impact on employment levels.
2Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) argue that removing some restrictions on the creation of temporary jobs
will increase employment at least in the short-run. Similarly, Nunziata and Staffolani (2007) theoretically
demonstrates that if the constraints on temporary employment contracts are strengthened, the total em-
ployment level will decrease. On the other hand, Blanchard and Landier (2002) show that weakening the
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The goal of this paper is to empirically investigate the differential effect of employ-
ment protection for temporary workers on levels of different types of employment. Specif-
ically, we attempt to contribute to the literature by focusing on the response of businesses
to the introduction of employment protection legislation for temporary workers. Al-
though a large number of the theoretical literature on employment protections illustrates
the effects on employment at the level of business, how establishments adjust—either
reduce or raise—their employment level in response to the employment protection leg-
islation is not empirically well explored.3 Specifically, a panel structure of our data al-
lows us to control for the time-invariant unobservable characteristics of a business, and
to observe the change of the employment level of an establishment after the implemen-
tation of the employment protection for temporary workers. Furthermore, using the de-
tailed establishment-level information, we provide empirical evidence that different level
of employment protection for permanent workers leads to variations in the response to
employment protection legislation for temporary workers.
We exploit South Korea’s labor reform which came into effect in 2007, to identify the
impact of the employment protection at level of the establishment.4 In particular, the two
laws regarding the protection of the temporary workers were passed in late 2006 and were
brought in effect on July 1st, 2007. The major component of the reform is to mandate the
employers to hire fixed-term contract and dispatched workers with more than two years
of tenure at the establishment as permanent employees. Thus, under the new laws, em-
ployment protection level for fixed-term contract and dispatched workers is expected to
protection for temporary workers will lead to a higher unemployment rate. Likewise, Cahuc and Postel-
Vinay (2002) argue that allowing firms to hire workers using temporary contracts will result in an increase
of unemployment when there is a strict employment protection for permanent workers.
3There are several studies investigating the impact of employment protection legislation on the rate of
employment adjustment and job flows at the business level (Adhvaryu, Chari, and Sharma, 2013; Autor,
Kerr, and Kugler, 2007; Hunt, 2000; Kan and Lin, 2011; Kugler and Pica, 2008)
4Our paper is not the first to examine the effect of the South Korean labor reform in 2007. Most notably,
Yoo and Kang (2012) exploits the fact that the restriction on the duration of use of fixed-term contracts and
dispatched workers does not apply to workers older than 55. Combining the difference-in-differences and
the regression discontinuity design, they find that employment protection for temporary workers has a
negative impact on total employment levels, at least in the short-run.
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increase discretely as they would benefit from the standard statutory employment pro-
tection that is provided for permanent workers after two years of tenure.
We use the fact that the establishment-level impact of this employment protection re-
form depends on the level of the use of fixed-term contract and dispatched workers in
each establishment. In particular, we construct the treatment intensity with the propor-
tion of the fixed-term contract and dispatched workers among total workers prior to the
reform. We then apply a difference-in-differences framework and compare the total em-
ployment level and the use of temporary workers by types of contracts across establish-
ments with different degrees of treatment intensity.
Our empirical analysis provides evidence that employment protection for temporary
workers has a small but statistically significant negative impact on total employment
level. In particular, we find that an establishment with a high proportion of fixed-term
contract and dispatched workers reduces their employment by a larger amount, com-
pared to the establishments that use those temporary workers less intensively. Specifi-
cally, we find that the stronger employment protection for temporary workers decreases
their number compared to permanent workers.
Moreover, our data shows that employment protection for specific types of tempo-
rary workers also has unintended consequences. That is, establishments respond to the
stronger employment protection for fixed-term contract and dispatched workers by in-
creasing the use of other types of temporary workers who are not protected by the la-
bor reform. In particular, establishment’s use of atypical temporary contract workers
increased after the introduction of the protective measures for typical temporary con-
tract workers. Furthermore, we show that this “balloon effect”—the increase in the in-
cidence of other types of atypical temporary employment contracts—is more prominent
among the establishments where the employment protection for permanent workers is
more stringent. Specifically, the establishments with a labor union increase the number of
other types of temporary workers by a larger amount than establishments without a labor
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union. Moreover, we find that the degree of substitution of temporary workers for per-
manent workers is less among the establishments with a labor union. Overall, our results
provide evidence that businesses respond to the employment protection legislation by
replacing the workers that become legally burdensome due to the reform. Our findings
are in line with Autor (2003) which finds that a stronger protection for regular workers
increases a firm’s use of temporary and outsourced workers. Furthermore, our results
are consistent with recent evidence from Chaurey (2015), which shows that increase in
employment protection induces firms to use temporary workers in order to circumvent
labor laws.
We have organized the remainder of this paper as follows: Section 2 explains the de-
tailed background information regarding the employment protection legislation on tem-
porary employment contracts in Korea. Section 3 describes the establishment-level panel
data used in this paper with summary statistics for key variables. Section 4 explains the
empirical strategy adopted for the analysis, followed by a discussion of the results in
Section 5. Section 6 offers a summary and concluding remarks.
2 Background
In this section, we provide background information regarding the definition of temporary
workers in Korea and the labor market reform in 2007 which was intended to protect these
workers.5 Temporary employment, as opposed to permanent employment, is usually
defined as employment under contracts that are expected to end after a specific period.
However, the detailed definition of temporary employment varies across countries. In
Korea, temporary workers include not only fixed-term contract workers and dispatched
(from a temporary work agency) workers but also part-time workers, contract workers as
5The details of the reform can be also found in Grubb, Lee, and Tergeist (2007) and Yoo and Kang (2012).
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well as at-home and on-call workers.6
The number of temporary workers in Korea increased rapidly after the Asian Eco-
nomic Crisis in the late 1990s. Specifically, the proportion of temporary workers in the
workforce rose from 16.6% in 2001 to 28.8% in 2006 (Grubb, Lee, and Tergeist, 2007). Tem-
porary workers are more likely to experience poor working conditions; therefore in order
to protect these workers, two bills protecting temporary workers were passed by the Ko-
rean legislature in November 30, 2006 and entered into force on July 1st, 2007.7
Prior to 2007, there were few restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts which
were a major form of temporary employment in Korea. However, the reform restricted
the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts to two years.8 Specifically, the law stipu-
lates that after the two year contract period, a fixed-term contract worker should become
a permanent employee unless the contract is terminated before two years. Moreover, the
law obligates a user company to directly hire a dispatched worker as a permanent em-
ployee if the user company continues to use the dispatched worker for over two years. In
short, the law requires an employer to hire fixed-term contract or dispatched workers as
permanent employees if the employer wants to use them for more than two years. Thus,
under the new law, fixed-term contract and dispatched workers become potential perma-
nent workers as their employment protection level is expected to discretely increase after
6In Korea, non-regular workers are often used to indicate workers who cannot expect stable employ-
ment with their current employer and have a lower level of employment protection than permanent
(regular) workers. In this paper, we use the two terms—temporary worker and non-regular worker—
interchangeably. The difference between dispatched workers and contract workers is whether the user
company (client) has the right to directly manage how workers function at their job. In particular, dis-
patched workers are employed by a temporary work agency but works under the supervision of the user
company. However, contract workers work under the control of their own employer (contractor) that con-
ducts the task requested by the client. Moreover, there is no direct legal relation between contract workers
and the client whereas the relation between dispatched workers and the user company is regulated by the
labor law. In particular, the contract for work, which is a specific form of commercial contract, only exists
between a contractor and a client. Thus, from a legal standpoint using contract workers through outsourc-
ing could be less burdensome for firms as clients of a contractor.
7The two separate laws, the Act on the Protection of Fixed-term and Part-time Workers and the Act on
the Protection of Dispatched Workers, are combined and called the Act on the Protection of Temporary
Workers.
8The restriction on the duration of fixed-term contracts applied to all fixed-term contracts with a few
exceptions. Most notably, the restriction does not apply to workers older than 55 at the time of the contract.
6
two years of tenure.9
This empirical setting is contrary to the reduction of employment protection for tem-
porary workers which occurred in the late 1990s in countries such as Germany and Nether-
lands where the regulations regarding the frequency of fixed-term contracts and the dura-
tion of the use of dispatched contracts were relieved (Kahn, 2010). Similar to the effects of
relieving employment protection on overall employment levels, the effect of strengthen-
ing employment protection for temporary workers is not theoretically clear. Specifically,
the number of temporary workers is likely to decrease and the number of permanent
workers would increase. This is because the potential cost of hiring temporary workers
increased while the cost of hiring permanent workers was unaffected by the labor reform.
However, the effect of employment protection on the total employment level would de-
pend on the relative size of the increase in permanent employment and the decrease in
temporary employment, which is ambiguous. Moreover, the magnitude of the decrease in
the numbers of temporary workers would depend on whether establishments can read-
ily substitute fixed-term contract and dispatched workers with other types of temporary
workers who are not protected by the reform.
Thus, the impact of the labor reform on overall employment levels and the composi-
tion of the workforce warrants empirical analysis. In the following sections, we explain
the data set and the identification strategy for empirical analysis.
9The other component of the reform includes prohibiting “discriminatory treatment” against temporary
workers which was gradually introduced by establishment size from 2007 and 2009. To be specific, the
Prohibition of Discriminatory Treatment was enforced first to the establishments with 300 or more workers
in July 1, 2007, and then to the establishments with 100 or more workers in July 1, 2008 and finally to all
establishments with five or more workers in July 1, 2009. However, it is not as binding as the restriction
on the length of the contracts since it allows employers to treat temporary workers differently based on the
justifiable reasons such as ability, types of task and performance.
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3 Data
To examine the impact of the 2007 employment protection legislation, we use the Work-
place Panel Survey (WPS) from 2005 and 2011 which has been collected biannually by
Korea Labor Institute. The establishments in the WPS were randomly chosen from a na-
tionally representative sample in the 2005 Census on Establishments collected by Statis-
tics Korea. The WPS covers establishments with more than 30 regular employees, i.e.,
employees under contracts for one year or longer, in all sectors with the exception of
agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying.
The dataset consists of a panel of approximately 1730-1900 establishments per wave
and includes detailed information on each establishment such as industry classification,
the age of establishment, location, and the existence of a labor union. More importantly,
the WPS shows the total number of workers used by each establishment including not
only employees directly hired by the establishment such as permanent workers but also
the various types of temporary workers such as dispatched workers, outsourced and sub-
contracted workers even though they are not employees of the establishment from a strict
legal viewpoint.10
Thus, the data allows us to examine the effects of employment protection on the over-
all employment levels of an establishment and the numbers of temporary workers. More-
over, the data has been collected since 2005 which is prior to the 2007 labor reform. Thus,
we are able to identify establishments that were expected to be severely affected by the
employment protection legislation by examining the use of fixed-term and dispatched
workers in 2005 which has not been altered by the reform in 2007.
Table 1 summarizes the data used for our empirical analysis. Since the sample in the
WPS is randomly selected from the establishments with 30 or more workers, the average
size of the establishments in our sample, measured by total employment, is large. On
10In this paper, we use two terms, total workers and total employment, interchangeably to refer the sum
of permanent and temporary workers used by an establishment although some types of temporary workers
do not have a direct employment relationship with the establishment.
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average, each establishment employed about 517 workers. This breaks down to an av-
erage number of permanent workers of 400 and average number of temporary worker
of approximately 117 for each establishment. Among temporary workers, an average
of 64 are fixed-term contract and dispatched workers whereas an average of 54 work-
ers are employed under other types of temporary contracts including part-time, contract
or at-home workers. The proportion of temporary worker among the total workers in
each establishment is approximately 17 percent on average. Specifically, the proportion
of fixed-term contract and dispatched workers is about 10 percent whereas the share of
the other types of temporary employment is seven percent of the total workers for an
average establishment in our dataset.
The age of establishment, defined as the difference between the year when it was
established and the survey year, is 22 year for the average establishment in our sample.
Labor unions are organized in about 42% of the establishments and about 18 percent of
the establishments laid off permanent employees for managerial and other reasons in the
past two years at the time of the survey. Moreover, about 47% of the establishments used
a performance pay scheme as a compensation system for their permanent employees.
More than half of the establishments are located in the seven metropolitan cities in South
Korea and 40% are in the manufacturing sector.11 Finally, the business entity of almost all
of the establishments is a corporation as opposed to a sole proprietorship, and more than
half of the establishments are single-unit firms—firms that have only one establishment.
4 Empirical Strategy
We apply a difference-in-differences framework to analyze how businesses adjust their
employment patterns in response to changes in employment protection. Specifically, we
compare the outcomes for establishments heavily affected by the labor reform with out-
11The seven metropolitan cities are Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Daejon, Gwangju and Ulsan.
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comes for establishments that were not substantially affected.
In particular, we use the proportion of fixed-term contract and dispatched workers
among total workers in each establishment in 2005—prior to the implementation of the
employment protection—as a continuous indicator for the treatment intensity.12 We cap-
ture the effect of employment protection legislation by comparing the mean changes of
outcome variables before and after the reform in 2007 across establishments with different
degrees of treatment intensity. Thus, the causal effect of the labor reform on an outcome
variable can be summarized by estimates derived from the following equation (1):
Yijrt = βA f tert · Treati + X′ijrtΦ+ δi + ρj + γr + τt + eijrt (1)
where Yijrt indicates various outcome variables of an establishment i, in industry j, in
region r at year t such as the number of total workers, the numbers of permanent and
temporary workers and the proportion of temporary workers. A f tert is a dummy vari-
able which takes a value equal to one after the laws restricting the use of fixed-term con-
tract and dispatched workers were enforced. Treati is the intensity of treatment which is
defined as the proportion of fixed-term contract and dispatched workers among the total
workers at each establishment in 2005. The coefficient of the interaction between A f ter
and Treat, β is the coefficient of interest and captures the causal effect of the employment
protection on an outcome variable, Yijrt. Xijrt is timing-varying characteristics of an es-
tablishment such as the type of business entity, the existence of a labor union and the use
of performance pay scheme for permanent workers. δi and ρj represent the set of dummy
variables for an establishment and industry, and γr and τt indicate region and time-fixed
effects, respectively.
For the difference-in-differences framework to be valid, the trend in outcome variables
across establishments with different degrees of treatment intensity should be similar in
12A more suitable measure for the treatment intensity would be the proportion of fixed-term contract and
dispatched workers with more than two years of tenure in each establishment. Unfortunately, this is not a
viable option as the WPS does not contain information about the average tenure of temporary workers.
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the absence of the employment protection legislation. One way to support this common
trend assumption is to show that the pre-legislation trends in outcome variables are sim-
ilar across establishments. Unfortunately, this is not possible in this case as the WPS only
contains one wave of data prior to the enforcement of the employment protection for
temporary workers. In Section 5.3, we attempt to overcome this restriction by examining
the equation (1) only for the establishments that reported their use of temporary workers
had been stable in 2005. That is, we provide a robustness check for our main result, by
examining the effect of the labor reform only in establishments for which the trend in one
of the outcome variables—the use of temporary workers—was similar.
5 Results
5.1 Main Result
In this section, we present empirical evidence regarding the causal impact of the Act on
the Protection for Temporary Workers. Table 2 summarizes the result for estimating equa-
tion (1) using the log of employment by various types of contracts as outcome variables.
All specifications include establishment-, industry-, region- and year-fixed effects. We
also control for the type of business entity, the existence of a labor union, the age of estab-
lishment and its squared term.
To begin with, Column (1) in Table 2 provides the result on the impact of employment
protection legislation on the establishment-level employment measured by the sum of
permanent and temporary workers at each establishment. The coefficient is small but
negative and statistically significant, which implies that the businesses that are heavily
affected by the reform are likely to reduce the labor use compared to those that are less
intensively affected by the reform. In particular, an average establishment which employs
10% of their workers on fixed-term and dispatched contract experienced 3% decrease in
total workers due to the labor reform, compared to an establishment using no fixed-term
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contract and dispatched workers.
Moreover, employment protection legislation for temporary workers increased the
permanent employment and decreased the temporary employment at the establishment
level. Columns (2) and (3) show a statistically significant effect of labor reform on the
level of permanent and temporary employment in opposite directions. In particular, the
magnitude of the coefficient indicating the increase of permanent employment is smaller
than the one describing the decrease of the temporary employment, consistent with the
negative effect of the labor reform on overall employment.
The next set of results show that labor reform had heterogeneous effects on temporary
workers across different types of temporary employment contracts. While Column (4)
shows the effect of the labor reform on the incidence of fixed-term contract and dispatched
workers, Column (5) exhibits the effect on the incidence of other temporary workers with
atypical labor contracts separately. In particular, it shows that an establishment reduced
the use of fixed-term contracts and dispatched workers but increased the use of other
atypical labor contracts, which are not restricted by the new law. The result is similar to
Autor (2003) documenting that the intent to protect the job security of permanent employ-
ees resulted in an increase of temporary employees who did not directly benefit from the
policy. In our case, the intent to protect a specific type of temporary contract worker in-
creased the use of other forms of temporary employment that are legally less burdensome
to the employers.
As a result of the heterogeneous impact of labor reform across various types of em-
ployment, the proportion of temporary workers in the total workers decreased within an
establishment. In addition, the proportion of fixed-term contract and dispatched workers
for which the duration of contract is directly restricted by labor reform also decreased.
However, the proportion of other forms of temporary employment increased due to the
impact of the new regulations on the use of fixed-term contract and dispatched workers.
These results are documented in Table 3, which summarizes the results from the estimat-
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ing equation (1) the using proportion of different forms of temporary workers among the
total employment in each establishment. In particular, Column (1) shows that the propor-
tion of temporary workers decreased due to labor reform legislation. Columns (2) and
(3) show that the decrease in the proportion of temporary workers is mainly driven by
a decrease in the proportion of fixed-term contract and dispatched workers and partially
offset by an increase in the proportion of other types of temporary employment.
Overall, the results show that the employment protection legislation has a negative
effect on total labor use of establishment. This decrease in total employment is due to
an insufficient increase of permanent employees to compensate for the sharp decrease of
fixed-term contract and dispatched workers. We also document business’s response to
the new law in the ways that policy makers and legislators did not intend; increasing the
use of certain types of temporary workers that are not protected by the law.
5.2 Labor Union and the effect of Employment Protection
In this subsection, we show that the pattern of business’s adjustments of labor use in re-
sponse to strengthening employment protection for fixed-term contract and dispatched
workers depends on its employment protection level for permanent workers. In partic-
ular, we provide evidence that the reduction in the number of fixed-term contract and
dispatched workers—potential permanent workers—is more prevalent among establish-
ments with a labor union, where the employment protection for permanent workers is
stronger. Furthermore, we show that the existence of a labor union in each establishment,
which strengthens the employment protection level for permanent employees, dampens
the substitution of permanent workers for temporary workers and amplifies the increase
of the use of atypical temporary contracts that are not protected by the labor reform.
The effect of labor reform in relation to the existence of a labor union is shown in
Tables 4 and 5. The Panel A of Table 4 and 5 describes the empirical results for the es-
tablishments with no labor union in 2005 and the Panel B summarizes the result for the
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establishments with a labor union. The Panel C shows the result of testing the statistical
difference between the coefficients for establishments with and without a labor union in
2005. Specifically, we include the interaction of A f ter, Treat and an indicator variable for
the existence of a labor union in 2005 in equation (1) and further allow other coefficients
in the equation to vary across establishments with and without a labor union. Thus, the
coefficient of the interaction of three variables, A f ter, Treat and the indicator variable for
the existence of a labor union in 2005, will capture the difference in the coefficients in the
Panels A and B.
The coefficients in Column (1) of Table 4 show that the negative impact of employment
protection legislation on total employment is larger among establishments with a labor
union where the employment protection for permanent workers is stronger. However,
the difference is not statistically significant. Columns (2) and (4) show that establish-
ments which have a stronger protection for permanent workers, increased the number
of permanent workers by a smaller amount and decreased fixed-term contract and dis-
patched workers by a larger amount in response to the labor reform. Column (5) shows
that business’s behavior to mitigate the impact of the labor reform by increasing the use
of atypical labor contracts is readily observed for the establishments with labor unions.
The results for the proportion of different types of temporary employment among
the total workers are consistent with the results using the log of temporary employment.
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 5 summarize the impact of the labor reform on the proportion
of temporary workers, fixed-term contract and dispatched workers and other atypical
temporary contract workers among the total workers, for the establishments with and
without labor union in 2005. Specifically, the increase in the proportion of other types of
temporary contract workers and the decrease in the proportion of fixed-term contract and
dispatched workers are larger among establishments with a labor union. These opposing
forces result in a small net difference on impact of the labor reform on the proportion of
temporary workers between establishments with and without a labor union in 2005.
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In sum, the unintended consequences of the labor reform, which were intended to
match the employment protection level for temporary workers to that of permanent work-
ers, increased with the existing gap in the employment protection level between perma-
nent and temporary workers. In particular, compared to establishments without a labor
union, establishments with a labor union were reluctant to increase the number of per-
manent workers and drastically reduced the number of workers on types of contract that
will be converted to permanent contracts after two years, in response to the labor reform.
5.3 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we perform several robustness checks for our main results documented
in Section 5.1. To begin with, we limit the sample to the establishments that are observed
in all four waves. That is, we use a balanced panel to estimate the equation (1) for various
outcomes.13 The results are summarized in the Panel A of Tables 6 and 7. Overall, the
results are not only qualitatively similar but also quantitatively similar to the main results
in Tables 2 and 3 that employ an unbalanced panel. Moreover, to explore the possibility
of whether the main result is driven by heterogeneous trends in an outcome variable
across establishments, we analyze the effect using establishments that reported stable
numbers of temporary workers prior to the implementation of employment protection
legislation.14 The results are summarized in the Panel B of Tables 6 and 7. The overall
results are consistent with our main findings and suggest that our results do not merely
reflect a difference in the existing employment trends by treatment intensity.
We also examine the mid-term effect of the employment protection legislation by re-
stricting the sample to the first and fourth waves—observed in 2005 and 2011—of the
13Since the WPS does not have information regarding the detail reasons for attritions, it is not possible
to examine the effect of the survival probability as an attrition from the sample could be simply due to the
refusal to answer the survey by the establishment.
14In the wave observed in 2005, the WPS questionnaire asks respondents about the trend in their use of
temporary workers which is categorized as follows: never used, declining, stable, increasing and other. We
restrict our analysis to the sample to the establishments that reported their use of temporary workers was
stable prior to 2005.
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survey. The results based on the sample excluding the intermediate years are presented
in the Panel C of Tables 6 and 7. These show that the effect of the employment protection
is not driven by the initial response of establishments as the coefficients are fairly consis-
tent with the main results even after exclusion of the intermediate years. In particular, the
results document that establishment’s behavior to substitute fixed-term contract and dis-
patched workers is still strongly observed even four years after the introduction of labor
reform.
As a further robustness check of our main results, we include additional controls in
equation (1) and attempt to formally address possibilities of omitted variable bias. To be-
gin with, in order to explicitly control for the possible effect of other components of the
reform in 2007—“Prohibition of Discriminatory Treatment”—we include the interaction
terms between year-fixed effects and dummy variables for different sizes of establish-
ments. Specifically, since the prohibition was gradually enforced by establishment size
as described in Section 2, we create a set of dummy variables for the establishment size
categories accordingly and interact each of those with a set of year-fixed effects. The esti-
mated results are provided in the Panel A of Tables 8–9 and are qualitatively similar with
the main result. Furthermore, we control for sector×year fixed effects to allow heteroge-
neous time-series shocks to specific industries in a given year. The results are summarized
in the Panel B of Tables 8 and 9 and show that our main results are qualitatively unaffected
by the inclusion of sector×year fixed effects.
Finally, we allow a macro shock or a business cycle to differentially affect establish-
ments by the degree of the use of fixed-term contracts and dispatched workers. In par-
ticular, our main specification used in Tables 2 and 3 controls for the year-specific macro
shock that is common across businesses. However, it is possible that the macro shock or
the business cycle may have heterogeneous effects on establishments with different treat-
ment intensities. If this is the case, the result could have been driven by the macro shock
that is not causally related with labor reform. This could be potentially important as the
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Global Financial Crisis occurred after labor reform in 2007. We explicitly control for this
possibility by following the approach of Kugler and Pica (2008) and adding the interac-
tion between the growth rate of GDP and treatment intensity in equation (1). The results
for this estimation are reported in Panel C of Tables 8–9. The results are both qualitatively
and quantitatively similar to the main result in Tables 2–3. Thus, this robustness check
supports that the main results are not driven by the heterogeneous impacts of business
cycle across establishments with different treatment intensities.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically examined establishment’s adjustment of labor use in re-
sponse to the employment protection legislation in Korea. We investigated the impact of
the introduction of the Act on the Protection of Temporary Workers enacted in 2007 which
restricted the maximum duration of specific types of temporary employment contracts.
Specifically, the new laws mandated companies to directly hire fixed-term contract and
dispatched workers with more than two years of tenure as permanent employees. The
impact of the reform varied across establishments depending on their pre-reform use of
fixed-term contract and dispatched workers. This allows us to set up a natural experiment
research design. We apply a difference-in-differences framework to the establishment-
level panel data and compare the mean change in outcome variables of businesses with
different degrees of treatment intensity before and after the labor reform introduction in
2007.
Our empirical analyses showed that stronger employment protection led to a decrease
in total employment at the establishment level. Moreover, the stronger employment pro-
tection for temporary workers decreased the relative proportion of temporary workers
compared to permanent workers. Furthermore, we show that the reform had unintended
consequences by increasing the use of temporary employment contracts that are not pro-
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tected by the reform. Specifically, we observed that businesses sharply reduced the use
of fixed-term contract and dispatched workers and increased the use of other types of
atypical labor contract workers. Furthermore, we show that this pattern—the reduction
in the use of temporary employment contracts that are potentially permanent after two
years—is more prevalent among establishments with strict employment protection for
their permanent workers.
Overall, our paper suggests that the increased employment protection for specific tem-
porary labor contracts would induces employers to avoid using these employment con-
tracts. Moreover, we further suggest that establishments will actively increase the use
of alternative temporary contracts in the presence of strict employment protection for
permanent employment. The implications of our paper are similar to Acemoglu and An-
grist (2001) and Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) in the sense that the policy which
intended to protect the job security of workers actually reduced the employment. More-
over, consistent with Autor (2003), our findings provide suggestive evidence that labor
unions which offer the employment protection for permanent employees, induce the in-
creased use of certain types of temporary workers with poorer job security and working
conditions.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
N(obs) Mean SD
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Total Workers 5808 516.95 1273.42
Permanent Workers 5809 399.52 998.43
Temporary Workers 5808 117.37 457.4
Fixed-Term Contract & Dispatched Workers 5809 63.54 313.61
Other Types of Temporary Workers 5808 53.81 296.93
Proportion of Temporary Workers 5808 0.17 0.22
Proportion of Fixed-Term Contract & Dispatched Workers 5808 0.1 0.17
Proportion of Other Types of Temporary Workers 5808 0.07 0.14
Establishment Age 5809 22.92 17.15
Organized Labor Union 5809 0.42 0.49
Permanent Employees Laid off in the Past Two Years 5809 0.18 0.39
Performance-based Pay Used 5809 0.47 0.5
Located in Metropolitan Cities 5809 0.57 0.5
Manufacturing Sector 5809 0.39 0.49
Business Entity is a Corporation 5809 0.97 0.17
Single-unit Firm 5809 0.57 0.49
N(obs) is the number of observations and SD is standard deviation. Please refer to Section 3, for the
detailed description of variables.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A f ter · Treat -0.302*** 0.935*** -2.767*** -4.572*** 1.190***
(0.091) (0.130) (0.240) (0.282) (0.296)
adj. R-sq 0.896 0.867 0.620 0.662 0.400
N 5808 5809 5808 5809 5808
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the establishment level.
A f ter · Treat is the interaction between A f ter and Treat where A f ter is a dummy variable indicat-
ing periods after the Act on the Protection of Temporary Workers was enforced in 2007 and Treat is
the intensity of treatment defined as the proportion of fixed-term contract and dispatched workers
among the total workers at each establishment in 2005. For all the dependent variables, we control for
timing-varying characteristics of establishment such as the foreign share, the type of business entity,
the existence of a labor union and the use of performance pay scheme for permanent workers. All the
regressions include establishment-, industry-, region- and year-fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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A f ter · Treat -0.480*** -0.638*** 0.158***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.025)
adj. R-sq 0.549 0.584 0.401
N 5808 5808 5808
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the establishment level.
A f ter · Treat is the interaction between A f ter and Treat where A f ter is a dummy variable indi-
cating periods after the Act on the Protection of Temporary Workers was enforced in 2007 and
Treat is the intensity of treatment defined as the proportion of fixed-term contract and dispatched
workers among the total workers at each establishment in 2005. For all the dependent variables,
we control for timing-varying characteristics of establishment such as the foreign share, the type
of business entity, the existence of a labor union and the use of performance pay scheme for per-
manent workers. All the regressions include establishment-, industry-, region- and year-fixed
effects.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Balanced Panel
A f ter · Treat -0.342*** 0.797*** -2.868*** -4.827*** 1.307***
(0.103) (0.126) (0.265) (0.317) (0.337)
adj. R-sq 0.899 0.874 0.622 0.653 0.421
N 4363 4364 4363 4364 4363
Panel B: Establishments Reporting Their Use of Temporary Workers Were Stable
A f ter · Treat -0.450*** 0.755*** -1.103*** -3.464*** 1.469***
(0.143) (0.172) (0.318) (0.424) (0.432)
adj. R-sq 0.892 0.895 0.589 0.624 0.362
N 2219 2219 2219 2219 2219
Panel C: Using the first and the fourth waves of WPS
A f ter · Treat -0.237* 0.912*** -3.163*** -4.939*** 1.625***
(0.128) (0.169) (0.352) (0.394) (0.366)
adj. R-sq 0.870 0.846 0.539 0.583 0.287
N 3096 3096 3096 3096 3096
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the establishment level.
A f ter · Treat is the interaction between A f ter and Treat where A f ter is a dummy variable indicat-
ing periods after the Act on the Protection of Temporary Workers was enforced in 2007 and Treat is
the intensity of treatment defined as the proportion of fixed-term contract and dispatched workers
among the total workers at each establishment in 2005. For all the dependent variables, we control for
timing-varying characteristics of establishment such as the foreign share, the type of business entity,
the existence of a labor union and the use of performance pay scheme for permanent workers. All the
regressions include establishment-, industry-, region- and year-fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 7: The Effect of Employment Protection on the Proportion of Temporary Workers
for Various Samples













Panel A: Balanced Panel
A f ter · Treat -0.483*** -0.659*** 0.175***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.029)
adj. R-sq 0.536 0.555 0.407
N 4363 4363 4363
Panel B: Establishments Reporting Their Use of Temporary Workers Were Stable
A f ter · Treat -0.376*** -0.567*** 0.191***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.038)
adj. R-sq 0.592 0.655 0.392
N 2219 2219 2219
Panel C: Using the first and the fourth waves of WPS
A f ter · Treat -0.513*** -0.697*** 0.184***
(0.048) (0.043) (0.035)
adj. R-sq 0.494 0.589 0.253
N 3096 3096 3096
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the establishment level.
A f ter · Treat is the interaction between A f ter and Treat where A f ter is a dummy variable indicating
periods after the Act on the Protection of Temporary Workers was enforced in 2007 and Treat is
the intensity of treatment defined as the proportion of fixed-term contract and dispatched workers
among the total workers at each establishment in 2005. For all the dependent variables, we control for
timing-varying characteristics of establishment such as the foreign share, the type of business entity,
the existence of a labor union and the use of performance pay scheme for permanent workers. All
the regressions include establishment-, industry-, region- and year-fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Control for the Possible Effects of the Prohibition of Discriminatory Treatment
A f ter · Treat -0.322*** 1.149*** -3.390*** -5.331*** 1.011***
(0.100) (0.152) (0.292) (0.329) (0.329)
adj. R-sq 0.897 0.870 0.627 0.679 0.408
N 5808 5809 5808 5809 5808
Panel B: Control for the Industry×Year Fixed Effects
A f ter · Treat -0.359*** 1.112*** -3.455*** -5.368*** 1.010***
(0.101) (0.150) (0.289) (0.326) (0.327)
adj. R-sq 0.896 0.870 0.627 0.679 0.407
N 5808 5809 5808 5809 5808
Panel C: Control for the Year-specific Macro Shock
A f ter · Treat -0.283*** 0.920*** -2.709*** -4.508*** 1.224***
(0.088) (0.133) (0.238) (0.283) (0.299)
adj. R-sq 0.896 0.867 0.621 0.662 0.400
N 5808 5809 5808 5809 5808
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the establishment level.
A f ter · Treat is the interaction between A f ter and Treat where A f ter is a dummy variable indicating pe-
riods after the Act on the Protection of Temporary Workers was enforced in 2007 and Treat is the inten-
sity of treatment defined as the proportion of fixed-term contract and dispatched workers among the to-
tal workers at each establishment in 2005. For all the dependent variables, we control for timing-varying
characteristics of establishment such as the foreign share, the type of business entity, the existence of a
labor union and the use of performance pay scheme for permanent workers. All the regressions include
establishment-, industry-, region- and year-fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 9: The Effect of Employment Protection on the Proportion of Temporary Workers
with Various Specifications













Panel A: Control for the Possible Effects of the Prohibition of Discriminatory Treatment
A f ter · Treat -0.572*** -0.707*** 0.134***
(0.038) (0.032) (0.026)
adj. R-sq 0.564 0.612 0.407
N 5808 5808 5808
Panel B: Control for the Industry×Year Fixed Effects
A f ter · Treat -0.575*** -0.705*** 0.129***
(0.038) (0.032) (0.026)
adj. R-sq 0.564 0.613 0.406
N 5808 5808 5808
Panel C: Control for the Year-specific Macro Shock
A f ter · Treat -0.471*** -0.631*** 0.160***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.026)
adj. R-sq 0.550 0.585 0.401
N 5808 5808 5808
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the establishment level.
A f ter · Treat is the interaction between A f ter and Treat where A f ter is a dummy variable indicating pe-
riods after the Act on the Protection of Temporary Workers was enforced in 2007 and Treat is the inten-
sity of treatment defined as the proportion of fixed-term contract and dispatched workers among the to-
tal workers at each establishment in 2005. For all the dependent variables, we control for timing-varying
characteristics of establishment such as the foreign share, the type of business entity, the existence of a
labor union and the use of performance pay scheme for permanent workers. All the regressions include
establishment-, industry-, region- and year-fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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